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NO. 9 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
Multilateralism 
Variants, Potential, Constraints and Conditions for Success 
Hanns W. Maull 
In view of the current challenges facing world politics and its specific structural 
conditions (national sovereignty, power diffusion), multilateralism appears to be 
an almost indispensable form of international diplomacy. Nevertheless, it seems 
controversial: multilateralism is currently under fire, particularly from the White 
House and the State Department, whilst both China’s President Xi Jinping and his 
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin pose as advocates and defenders of multilateral-
ism. On closer inspection, however, the controversy is not about multilateralism as a 
diplomatic procedure, but essentially about the question of which principles, values 
and organizations should determine the international order and thus shape inter-
national politics. At the same time, the inherent difficulties and limitations of multi-
lateralism are often underestimated, and its potential overestimated. In order to 
make multilateralism as effective as possible, a realistic assessment of its precondi-
tions and a wise understanding of the peculiarities of multilateral politics are there-
fore essential. 
 
“Multilateralism” is axiomatic for German 
foreign policy. The same applies to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy of 
the European Union (Article 21 EU-Treaty). 
It is in this spirit that the Foreign Office 
(together with the French Foreign Ministry) 
launched the “Alliance for Multilateralism” 
in September 2019. But what exactly does it 
mean when the Federal Foreign Office on 
its homepage describes “the commitment to 
multilateralism” as one of the “guard rails 
of German foreign policy”? 
“Multilateralism”: 
a clarification of terms 
Furthermore, outside the EU, governments 
appear firmly committed to multilateral-
ism, at least if we are to believe the ringing 
endorsements offered by China’s President 
Xi Jinping, his Russian counterpart Vladi-
mir Putin, or the Indian President Narendra 
Modi. Yet it is questionable that they all 
mean the same thing when they express 
their support for multilateralism. 
So: what is multilateralism? First, it 
simply means the coordinated diplomatic 
interaction of three or more states (or other 
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actors) in international politics. According 
to this definition, the term is not contro-
versial; “multilateral” foreign and security 
policy stands in contrast to bilateral or uni-
lateral action. This understanding of multi-
lateralism (“Multilateralism I”) is therefore a 
purely formal category: multilateral policy 
is about the “how” not the “what”, about 
the conduct rather than the substance and 
goals of international politics. In short, this 
version of multilateralism is a diplomatic 
approach to achieving certain unspecified 
ends. 
German foreign policy uses the concept 
of multilateralism with a different, rather 
more exigent interpretation (“Multilateral-
ism II”). This combines coordinated diplo-
matic interactions of more than two actors 
with action within the framework of inter-
national organizations, oriented towards 
the principles and norms and carried out in 
accordance with the rules and regulations 
that underlie those organizations (such as, 
for example, the United Nations Charter). 
In this version, a multilateral foreign policy 
stands not only for a specific diplomatic 
approach, but also for a commitment to 
certain principles, substantive goals and 
methods of foreign policy – and for an 
underlying set of values. 
Multilateralism thus comes to stand for 
foreign policy action within the normative 
framework of a system of ideas about what 
diplomacy should strive for, and by what 
means it should pursue its goals. Occasion-
ally there is talk of a “multilateral system” 
that must be preserved (as, for example, in 
the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s White 
Paper on multilateralism). This “system” 
is in fact the liberal, Western-style inter-
national order of 1945 in its renewed 
version of 1990. 
“Multilateralism II” refers to foreign 
and security policies that seek to establish, 
maintain and further develop a specific, 
normative international order through 
specific forms of international diplomacy. 
The order may be the currently disintegrat-
ing liberal international order, but it could 
also be another, quite different order that 
would be based on a different ideology, 
although it would also be promoted “multi-
laterally”, i.e. together with others. 
It is this meaning of the term that seems 
to prevail in international politics today. In 
this sense, the notion of “multilateralism” 
contains, conveys and transports norms and 
values; it identifies the ends and the appro-
priate means to conduct foreign policy; 
and it concerns the international order con-
sidered desirable and the regulatory policies 
considered conducive to it by a specific 
actor. These ideas will often not be made 
explicit, however, and even be deliberately 
disguised. Multilateralism in this sense is 
therefore no longer primarily about acting 
together with others, but rather about 
securing certain objectives and interests 
that are closely linked to highly specific 
(and possibly controversial) ideas of inter-
national order. Multilateralism II a priori 
does not say anything about which princi-
ples, values, norms, rules, organizations 
and procedures (should) be followed in 
the conduct of international affairs. But if 
“multilateralism” is elevated into a prin-
ciple (as in the case of German foreign 
policy), or (more precisely) if it is freighted 
with certain principles and values, then we 
are in fact dealing with several, possibly 
very different and even controversial notions 
of multilateralism, with – as is currently 
the case – the views of important actors 
differing about the desirable ideological 
and normative foundations of the inter-
national order. 
The fact that there is no broad consensus 
in world politics today on the principles 
and norms of the international order is 
ignored by the third meaning of the term 
multilateralism (“Multilateralism III”). Here, 
“multilateralism” refers to the “right” and 
“appropriate” answers to the current prob-
lems of world politics and thus stands for 
effective world governance. The European 
Union’s first Security Strategy of 2003 spe-
cifically used this understanding when it 
developed the notion of “effective multi-
lateralism” as its guiding concept; today, 
however, the word “multilateralism” often 
seems to be equated with “effective global 
governance”. 
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If “Multilateralism II” stands for (various 
and controversial) regulatory ideas about 
world politics, “Multilateralism III” ex-
presses the principle of hope. In order to 
fulfil this hope and to exploit the potential 
of effective multilateralism, however, two 
types of hurdles would need to be over-
come. First, there must be consensus about 
the normative foundations and the concrete 
contents of multilateral diplomacy: what is 
at stake, what ends are to be achieved, what 
interests and values are to be accommodated 
and how – and what concepts of inter-
national order will thereby be promoted. 
None of this can be contested or contro-
versial. 
The second hurdle on the road to effec-
tive multilateralism concerns its organiza-
tion and implementation. Even where there 
is broad agreement on principles, values 
and goals, we have necessary but not yet 
sufficient preconditions for effective multi-
lateralism. Multilateral cooperation within 
the framework of the Paris Convention on 
Climate Policy demonstrates this: it is based 
on common principles, standards and pro-
cedures. Yet multilateral climate policy is 
far from slowing global warming to the 
desired and necessary extent. The specific 
problems and limitations of multilateral 
action are the crux here. 
Why do we need “multilateral” 
foreign policy? 
Anyone who argues in favour of multilater-
alism (i.e. for all three meanings of the term) 
generally relates it to three contextual as-
sumptions – assumptions about the mag-
nitude of upcoming global challenges, 
about the realities of power distribution in 
international relations, and about the enor-
mous potential of cooperative strategies. 
The dimensions of the challenges ahead. Some 
of the global challenges currently facing 
international politics may be of existential 
importance for the future of humankind – 
from climate change to the manifold 
destructions in our ecosphere, from the 
opportunities and risks of new technol-
ogies to the danger of nuclear war. At the 
same time, according to assessments by 
the respective expert communities, many 
of those challenges place extraordinarily 
high demands on the performance of inter-
national politics in terms of global gov-
ernance: decisive progress often appears 
possible only when many actors work 
together in broad coalitions bringing to-
gether not only states, but also non-state 
actors such as international organizations, 
civil society actors or companies. The influ-
ence of even the largest powers (such as 
the USA or the People’s Republic of China) 
alone would not be sufficient. 
Diffuse distribution of power and the principle 
of sovereignty. International politics will 
continue to be determined by the absence 
of hierarchy and a broad distribution of 
power. This is due on the one hand to gen-
erally accepted principles of the current 
world order, in particular the principles 
of territoriality and sovereignty of nation 
states, and on the other hand to the large 
number of state and non-state actors that 
influence the course of world politics. The 
United Nations is now approaching 200 
state members, and there is also a rapidly, 
sometimes exponentially growing universe 
of governmental and non-governmental 
international organizations, civil society 
actors and transnational corporations. 
The potential for shaping multilateralism. It is 
often assumed that if international coopera-
tion were sufficiently broad, it would be 
possible to develop options on a global scale 
that would be analogous to those available 
to the nation state within its own territory, 
as the term “global governance” suggests. 
Science and technology and the organisa-
tional resources of governments and non-
state actors can and should indeed provide 
the necessary problem-solving potential. 
This could be mobilized effectively if the 
(theoretically extensive) problem-solving 
capacities of the nation state were effectively 
coordinated through international coopera-
tion. In practice, however, the state’s mo-
nopoly on the use of force and its (ideal 
or typical) extensive possibilities to shape 
politics within its own borders are often far 
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less comprehensive and far less powerful 
than is assumed. These empirical deficien-
cies in statehood can – to a degree – be 
compensated by new forms of interaction 
between state and non-state actors and in-
ternational organizations. Overall, however, 
the problem-solving capacity of multilater-
alism seems quite uncertain. Its potential 
for realising effective world governance will 
depend considerably on favourable con-
ditions. 
Multilateral diplomacy: 
advantages and problems 
The strengths and weaknesses of multilateral 
diplomacy in dealing with global challenges 
seem obvious. Multilateral diplomacy not 
only offers better opportunities for dealing 
with complex tasks, it is also better able 
to legitimise the results achieved and thus 
tends to make them more sustainable, since 
they emerge from joint efforts. This is par-
ticularly true if the participation is con-
sidered representative, i.e. if all important 
interests and positions were represented. 
So “together we are strong”. Yes – but 
strength can show itself as stubborn per-
sistence, but also as flexibility, adaptability 
and assertiveness. What kind of strength 
is required depends on the context. Multi-
lateral negotiations tend to broaden their 
agenda in order to take better account of 
the different objectives and interests of the 
parties involved. This makes it difficult to 
set clear priorities. Multilateralism is more 
protracted and costly than bilateral agree-
ments or a unilateral oktroi. While the 
results of multilateral agreements are gen-
erally broad and weighty, they may not be 
very effective in responding to the problem 
at hand because they are characterised by 
compromises and lowest common denomi-
nators. In principle, there is an inversely 
proportional relationship between legiti-
macy and effectiveness, which usually re-
quires trade-offs. More legitimacy may have 
to be bought at the price of reduced effec-
tiveness, more effectiveness at the price of 
reduced legitimacy. The same applies to the 
temporal dimension: negotiation outcomes 
that reflect broad-based multilateral partici-
pation may take longer, but they will prob-
ably last longer and thus be more sustain-
able. Conversely, urgent problems requiring 
rapid action can be better tackled by a small 
number of actors who are willing and able 
to move forward. Multilateral diplomacy is 
indispensable when fundamental issues of 
international governance have to be resolved. 
In acute crises and in specific problem con-
texts, on the other hand, the disadvantages 
of multilateralism are more significant. 
Other inherent difficulties with multi-
lateralism are the well-known problems of 
collective action. These include situations 
resembling the classic game theory pris-
oner’s dilemma, in which the best solution 
to a conflict for all involved cannot be 
realized due to the absence of trust. An-
other problem is free riding and its weaker 
variant, in which the commitment to par-
ticipate in collective action is half-hearted: 
after all, others are already taking care of 
the problem, so one’s own efforts can be 
reduced if not stopped (which would be 
full free riding). In the worst case scenario, 
multilateralism can nurture illusions – 
such as the illusion that the world is mak-
ing progress on military disarmament 
because multinational negotiations are 
dealing with it. In some cases, this has been 
the situation for decades, as with the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament, which has not 
produced any significant results for over 
twenty years. 
Thirdly, the implementation of multi-
lateral agreements is generally left to the 
parties involved. In general, it is difficult to 
sanction violations of international agree-
ments. Nevertheless, observation, monitor-
ing and review mechanisms can be set up 
to improve the chances of successful imple-
mentation. International assistance can also 
be provided for corresponding national im-
plementation measures where such possi-
bilities exist and the support is accepted. 
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Conditions for 
effective multilateralism 
Effective multilateralism therefore depends 
on a number of prerequisites. The most 
important concern the parties involved and 
their attitude. First, do they share a genuine 
interest in sustainable results, or does their 
participation in the multilateral negotia-
tions merely serve tactical goals? Secondly, 
is there willingness to compromise, i.e. are 
the demands and expectations that have 
been made by the parties negotiable? Thirdly, 
is there willingness to act on the basis of 
“diffuse reciprocity” (Robert O. Keohane), 
i.e. to practise solidarity in the expectation 
that in the long run its benefits will out-
weigh immediate short-term disadvantages? 
Further prerequisites concern the (domestic) 
legitimacy of the negotiators and their 
ability to make binding commitments on 
behalf of those they represent, as well as 
organisational arrangements for the suc-
cessful implementation of commitments 
made. If these conditions are not met, there 
is a risk that multilateral diplomacy will be 
unable to achieve anything positive and 
may even be harmful. Risks include agree-
ments that prove unworkable (such as the 
UN protection zones in the former Yugo-
slavia in the early 1990s) or are irrelevant 
because they ignore the real problems (such 
as the Munich Agreement of 1938, which 
did nothing to stop Hitler’s war prepara-
tions). Such agreements risk damaging the 
perception, reputation and credibility of 
multilateralism, and contribute to the ero-
sion or creeping reinterpretation of the 
underlying international order. In the worst 
case scenario, multilateral negotiations can 
be tactically misused as smoke screens to 
conceal unilateral power politics. 
In principle, the disadvantages of multi-
lateralism can be mitigated and perhaps 
even eliminated by appropriate procedures, 
as long as the parties involved behave con-
structively and are willing to compromise. 
Essential for getting there, however, is wise 
and effective political leadership, either by 
one actor alone or by a core group in the 
negotiations. Their leadership tasks include 
structuring and advancing the agenda with 
a view to achieving effective results; ensur-
ing that deadlines are met and that progress 
is made as quickly as possible; and breaking 
down blockades in the negotiations. In this 
context, it becomes clear that even a for-
eign policy that is consistently multilateral 
in orientation must also at times incorpo-
rate unilateral action and, above all, inten-
sive bilateral diplomacy in order to make 
effective multilateralism possible. The im-
portance of bilateral relations for the effec-
tiveness of multilateral diplomacy is illus-
trated – both positively and negatively – 
by the role of the Franco-German tandem 
in the history and development of Euro-
pean integration. In general, it is difficult to 
imagine how coalitions could be successfully 
forged or crises overcome in negotiation 
processes without intensive bilateral diplo-
macy. However, bilateralism is certainly 
problematic for multilateral diplomacy 
when it is not treated as a component of 
good multilateralism but rather as an alter-
native to it. 
The “Alliance for Multilateralism” 
With the “Alliance for Multilateralism”, 
German foreign policy – in close coopera-
tion with France – initiated an “informal 
alliance” that aims to give multilateralism 
new momentum. Functioning segments 
of the current international order are to 
be preserved, fragile areas renewed and 
strengthened, and hitherto inadequately 
regulated parts are to be drawn into the 
multilateral order. At a meeting of the 
Alliance on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly in September 2019, some fifty 
states signalled their interest in participat-
ing. 
The initiative builds on the strengths of 
German diplomacy. It persuaded France to 
serve as co-organizer of the New York meet-
ing and then took on board five more states 
(Canada, Mexico, Chile, Ghana and Singa-
pore), which demonstrated Germany’s 
ability to forge coalitions. However, the 
composition of the group – the Freedom 
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House Index of 2019, which measures the 
degree of democracy and freedom in a 
country on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least 
free), classifies Mexico and Singapore as 
“partly free”, while Canada, Chile and 
Ghana are “free” – indicates that different 
ideological and regulatory ideas can come 
together in this informal alliance. What 
united the group under the perspective of 
“Multilateralism II” is therefore not neces-
sarily principled multilateralism in the 
sense of German and European foreign 
policy. Indeed, there may not be a shared 
understanding of principles at all. Rather, 
the Alliance is about pragmatic agreements 
on specific issues. Although this is under-
standable, it is not without its problems. 
The Alliance concentrates on appeals in 
areas where agreements are relatively easy 
to reach because the interests of the parties 
involved are aligned (as in the case of the 
envisaged regime for lethal autonomous 
weapons systems of the future, in which 
those states that are primarily involved in 
such systems do not participate). It also 
helps that (as in the case of the appeal for 
humanitarian aid) agreements are of a non-
binding nature. The Alliance thus focuses 
on secondary issues in international poli-
tics, which either avoid subjects where 
fundamental regulatory differences make 
agreements hard, or exclude these differ-
ences (and their protagonists) and thus 
arrive at agreements with limited relevance. 
However, the threat to the multilateral 
order manifests itself most immediately in 
its core areas, such as international trade, 
non-proliferation or human rights and 
international law. Agreements on subordi-
nate issues may, of course, still contribute 
to securing the international order, if they 
work well and circumstances are favour-
able. Yet they could also become part of 
the erosion of the regulatory foundations 
of international order, for example by per-
mitting the weakening of links between 
specific arrangements and the fundamental 
elements of the old, liberal international 
order, or by entering into agreements that 
implicitly or explicitly embody other, revi-
sionist principles. It is certainly true that 
climate change is confronting foreign and 
security policy with completely new chal-
lenges, as one of the six initiatives of the 
Alliance for Multilateralism indicates. But 
what impact would the proposed referral of 
these issues to the United Nations have on 
the Paris Climate Convention? What added 
value would envisaged monitoring by the 
United Nations have compared to the cor-
responding efforts within the framework 
of UN climate policy? There is a danger that 
the effectiveness of climate policy will be 
impaired rather than enhanced by its link 
to security policy. Similarly, the support 
of the Alliance for Women’s Rights, which 
focuses on the increased promotion of girls 
in educational systems in Africa, takes 
up existing initiatives of UNESCO and the 
G7 – but why? If the activities taking place 
within those frameworks are inadequate, 
the Alliance would need to explain how 
it can make those efforts more effective. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that existing 
efforts will be diluted. 
Thus, the loose structure of the Alliance 
and its variable geometry harbours the 
danger that fundamental regulatory prin-
ciples and norms of the existing inter-
national order could be gradually weakened 
or even redefined. Chinese diplomacy in 
particular is endeavouring to introduce its 
view of the international order into multi-
lateral politics and thus to reshape it – for 
example, by strengthening the principle of 
non-interference in relation to universally 
valid human rights, or by measuring de-
mocracy in international politics by the par-
ticipation rights of states (and thus of their 
respective rulers), but not those of the 
people in the states. 
Strategically, a foreign policy that is con-
sistently multilateral in the sense of Ger-
man and European principles and premises 
should seek solutions to specific problems 
only where this would not imply damage 
to, or risks for, the future development of 
the international order. The Alliance’s ini-
tiative to protect humanitarian aid organi-
sations and their programmes for alleviat-
ing acute needs, for example, calls on states 
to disseminate knowledge of international 
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humanitarian law and international hu-
manitarian principles, to support aid 
organisations that are negotiating access 
to people in need, and to ensure “better” 
protection for aid workers. However, it is 
doubtful what added value this appeal 
could bring about: right-minded states will 
heed these demands anyway, while those 
that are less well-intentioned will either not 
heed them at all or fulfil their obligations 
at their own discretion. At the same time, 
however, the appeal helps to shift the focus 
of human rights policies towards “humani-
tarian disasters” – and thus away from 
the domestic political conditions of human 
rights within states, to the detriment of 
the worldwide observance of these rights. 
Strategies and tactics for 
effective multilateralism 
Activity for activity’s sake therefore in-
volves risks; less can be more. On the other 
hand, the ambition level of the alliance 
should be raised, even if this increases the 
risk of failure. In order to make progress 
in key areas, coalitions with partners are 
needed (these can be sub-state or non-state 
actors, in addition to states and inter-
national organisations). And these partners 
should not only be able and willing to com-
promise on concrete issues, but also share 
fundamental normative and regulatory 
convictions. In the case of agreements in 
secondary areas, care must be taken to 
ensure that they do not have any indirect 
negative effects on the core areas of the 
international order. 
Tactically, German and European foreign 
policy should make a vigorous effort to 
make multilateral processes as efficient as 
possible. Here, a distinction must be made 
between the output (the formal results of 
multilateral processes), their outcomes 
(i.e., their implementation) and finally their 
impact (the actual effects on the problem 
context). Advancing the negotiation pro-
cesses will require persistent and resolute 
leadership. Of course, Germany does not 
necessarily have to provide this on its own. 
However, these critically important leader-
ship responsibilities – in the sense of 
focusing the agenda, tight time manage-
ment, exploring possibilities for compro-
mise, and the effective implementation of 
agreements reached – demand intensive 
bilateral diplomacy, and occasionally also 
unilateral initiatives. 
The principles and normative orienta-
tions of German and European foreign 
policy, and also a realistic assessment of 
power relations, suggest that German and 
European leadership in multilateral con-
texts must rely primarily on persuasion and 
incentives. This is less problematic than it 
may at first seem in view of current trends 
in world politics: the shifts in power to-
wards authoritarian or neo-totalitarian 
political systems often obscure the impact 
of power diffusion that tends to limit the 
influence of such systems. In this respect, 
Germany and the European Union are not 
in a particularly bad position in terms of 
power politics. Doubts remain, however, as 
to whether German and European foreign 
policy are adequately mobilizing and utiliz-
ing their power potential. The most impor-
tant cause for this weakness can be found 
in domestic political circumstances: up 
until now, European societies could not 
be persuaded to give foreign and security 
policies the importance they deserve and 
the resources they need. 
To close this gap, or at least to reduce it, 
would require strategies aimed at streng-
thening Germany’s and Europe’s own power 
base. Two factors are particularly important 
in this respect: the enormous destructive 
potential of technological innovation for 
the future of our civilization, and the deep 
interdependencies between countries and 
societies, which are usually reciprocal but 
also asymmetrical: all parties concerned 
depend on each other, though not neces-
sarily equally. The first factor suggests that 
military and economic deterrence will play 
a greater role in the future than has been 
the case over the last thirty years. With 
regard to the second factor, ways of instru-
mentalising asymmetrical interdependence 
politically will assume even greater political 
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importance in international affairs. How-
ever, the metaphor of “weaponized inter-
dependence”, developed in this context, 
is as misleading as it is telling: analogous 
to the arguments by the arms lobby, it 
excludes the unintended, unexpected 
repercussions of using weapons on third 
parties and ultimately on the person who 
uses the weapon. (Note that the metaphor 
admits that it relates to interdependence and 
thus implicitly recognizes potentially nega-
tive effects on the actor herself!). 
The power potential arising from asym-
metric interdependence is therefore more 
difficult to actualize effectively and pre-
cisely than is usually recognized. Never-
theless, it must be taken seriously. Yet the 
possibilities for influencing other actors are 
not based on dependence per se, but on the 
vulnerability of the target to the threat or 
actual interruption of exchanges (or, alter-
natively, on the corruptibility of the ad-
dressee, i.e. his receptiveness to rewards 
and incentives, if these are brought into 
play with the aim of influencing inter-
dependence relationships). A wise foreign 
policy of principled multilateralism there-
fore needs well-founded analyses of one’s 
own vulnerabilities and those of one’s 
partners and adversaries, as well as policies 
and programmes that reduce one’s own 
vulnerabilities and target those of adver-
saries. The former will have to include 
educating one’s own population about 
the opportunities and risks, the benefits 
and costs of multilateralism. 
Prof. Dr. Hanns W. Maull is a Senior Distinguished Fellow and a Visiting Fellow with the Executive Board of SWP. 
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